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Re-Imagining Resolution of Online 
Defamation Disputes
EMILy B. LAIDLAW*
If an individual or company is defamed online, they have two options to resolve the dispute, 
absent a technical solution. They can complain to an intermediary or launch a civil action. 
Both are deficient for a variety of reasons. Civil litigation is often unsuitable given the nature 
of online communications (across different platforms, jurisdictions, involving multiple 
parties, and spread with ease), the length and cost of litigation, and the ineffectiveness of 
traditional remedies. Intermediary dispute resolution processes can sometimes be effective, 
but lack industry standards and due process, place intermediaries in pseudo-judicial roles, 
and depend on the changeable commitments of management. At its core, the problem is 
the high-volume, low-value, and legally complex matrix of online defamation disputes. In 
this article, I ask: Are there alternative ways to resolve disputes that would improve access 
to justice and resolution for complainants? The key to resolving some of these problems, I 
argue, is revisiting the basic issue of what complainants want in the resolution of a defamation 
dispute and then connecting this with innovations in dispute resolution. Ultimately, I 
recommend the creation of an online tribunal as a complement to traditional court action. In 
coming to this conclusion, I explore various issues and proposals for reform, including the 
challenges wrought by online defamation, what defamation claimants want when they sue, 
the role of technology in resolving such disputes, streamlined court processes, online dispute 
resolution, and the regulatory role of intermediaries.
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RESOLVING ONLINE DEFAMATION DISPUTES is challenging for a variety of 
reasons. There might be multiple potential wrongdoers posting anonymously or 
pseudonymously. Defendants and intermediaries are sometimes located out of 
jurisdiction. Once a defamatory post is online, it is immortalized—in search 
engines, screenshots, sharing, archiving, et cetera—making erasure through 
content removal almost impossible. In addition, the nature of online spaces poses 
problems to resolution, with communications sent across different platforms and 
contexts, and involving multiple parties and unique communities with varying 
social norms about what is considered acceptable behaviour.
These challenges are exacerbated by the constraints of traditional litigation, 
which is slow, expensive, and rarely delivers the results complainants seek. 
Online defamation is an uneasy fit with traditional litigation because while the 
volume of defamation complaints is high, they are often not worth litigating 
given the low potential damages and legal complexity involved. More often, 
resolution of online defamation disputes is achieved through intermediaries’1 
1. There are many ways to define an internet intermediary. In the past I have approached 
intermediaries as those that control the flow of information online, identifying a particular 
category of gatekeeper (an internet information gatekeeper), which impacts participation 
and deliberation in democratic culture. A simpler definition, for our purposes, is that of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, which defines intermediaries as 
those that “bring together or facilitate transactions between third parties on the Internet.” See 
OECD, Economic and Social Role of Internet Intermediaries (April 2010), online: <www.oecd.
org/internet/ieconomy/44949023.pdf> [perma.cc/26HY-WC2S] at 9. Note that sometimes I 
use the term “platform,” which refers to the core role some intermediaries play in mediating 
and designing how we participate in the world. Julie Cohen aptly notes that “platforms are 
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dispute resolution processes based on their terms and conditions of use. All of 
this creates a potential access to justice problem, where we have a high volume of 
defamation complaints, but prohibitive barriers for claimants seeking resolution 
through the courts.2
This article takes a step back and asks whether there is a better way to resolve 
these types of disputes. To put it another way: If we could design the system 
from scratch, what dispute resolution framework would improve access to justice 
and resolution for online defamation complainants? Ethan Katsh and Orna 
Rabinovich-Einy capture the access to justice issues with internet disputes:
One of the oldest maxims of law is that “there is no right without a remedy.” The 
history of law’s experience with the internet reveals a focus on statutory changes 
and court decisions but a neglect of remedies or dispute resolution processes. eBay’s 
sixty million disputes and Alibaba’s hundreds of millions of disputes are impressive, 
but also an indication that government and courts were not viable options. It also 
illustrates that innovative use of the new technologies can respond effectively to 
disputes.3
For the purpose of this article, access to justice is conceived in relation to 
dispute resolution. I adopt the definition used by the Online Dispute Resolution 
(ODR) Advisory Group of the Cyber Justice Council in the United Kingdom. 
The group argues for a “rethinking of access to justice”4 and advocates for a 
broader definition than dispute resolution (focused narrowly on resolutions 
through courts or streamlining court procedures) to include dispute avoidance 
and containment. Dispute avoidance is based on the belief that information 
enables parties to evaluate their situation and thereby avoid or resolve disputes. 
This might include tools to diagnose a legal problem or to prevent one from 
arising in the first place.5 Dispute containment focuses on de-escalating disputes 
and facilitating resolution.6 Access to justice as it is used in this article means 
the core organizational form of the emerging informational economy.” See Julie Cohen, “Law 
for the Platform Economy” (2017) 51 UC Davis L Rev 131 at 135.
2. Alastair Mullis & Andrew Scott, “Reframing Libel: Taking (All) Rights Seriously and Where 
It Leads” (2012) 63 N Ir Leg Q 5 at 12. See also Trevor Farrow, “What Is Access to Justice?” 
(2014) 51 Osgoode Hall LJ 957.
3. Ethan Katsh & Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Digital Justice: Technology and the Internet of Disputes 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2017) at 15.
4. United Kingdom, Online Dispute Resolution Advisory Group, Online Dispute Resolution for 
Low Value Civil Claims (London: Civil Justice Council, 2015) at 17, online: <www.judiciary.
gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Online-Dispute-Resolution-Final-Web-Version1.pdf> 
[perma.cc/LZ7W-VJZD] [ODRAG].
5. Ibid at 17-19.
6. Ibid (and accompanying figures visually outlining their approach to access to justice).
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three things: (1) dispute avoidance, (2) dispute containment, and (3) dispute 
resolution.7 I adopt this definition, because it allows for a wider set of remedial 
mechanisms to be considered, which Part I will show to be key to the nature of 
online defamation disputes.
In Part I, I identify the challenges of resolving online defamation disputes. 
This involves asking some of the following questions: What unique problems are 
posed to legal regulation by online defamation? Why do defamation plaintiffs sue? 
What outcomes do complainants want in the resolution of a defamation dispute? 
The answers to these questions provide the foundation for Parts II and III. In Part 
II, I examine various proposals for reforming resolution of legal disputes, both 
defamation and non-defamation specific, with a focus on the potential roles of 
ODR and intermediaries. In Part III, I make recommendations to reform the 
law, including conceptualizing an online dispute resolution framework that is 
aimed to meet the needs identified in Part I and incorporates lessons from Part II.
I. REPUTATION AND RESOLUTION
Re-imagining the resolution of online defamation disputes invites reflection on 
various aspects of defamation, in particular, the meaning of reputation in the 
digital age, specific problems created by online communications, and the kinds 
of outcomes complainants want. Such an enquiry helps identify the features 
that are important in a dispute resolution system and critical to improving 
access to justice.
A. REPUTATION AND CHALLENGES IN THE DIGITAL WORLD
An orienting case is Pritchard v Van Nes8 where Ms. Van Nes posted defamatory 
comments on Facebook about her neighbour, a middle school music teacher, 
which implied that he was a pedophile and unfit to teach children.9 Before the 
internet, Ms. Van Nes might have casually made these accusations to friends at a 
pub, for example, but she would have been less likely to stand on a podium with 
a microphone and repeat the accusations to a large audience. If these comments 
were communicated in the pub on a night out with friends, then however unfair 
and defamatory, the restrictions of the space and social convention meant there 
were built-in limits to the reputational damage. However, in the digital age, 
7. Ibid at 17.
8. 2016 BCSC 686 [Pritchard].
9. Ibid at para 74 (Justice Saunders accepted this defamatory meaning).
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defamation of this type is communicated with ease on social networking sites 
and with the impact of being centre stage with a megaphone.
In this case, Ms. Van Nes “vented,”10 as she put it, to her Facebook friends. 
Instead of her comments being heard by a few friends, her post was seen by 
over 2,000 Facebook friends, and commented on 48 times by 36 different 
friends.11 These comments characterized the defendant as “a ‘pedo’, ‘creeper’, 
‘nutter’, ‘freak’, ‘scumbag’, ‘peeper’ and a ‘douchebag.’”12 In addition, her post 
was potentially visible not only to friends, but also friends-of-friends, and even 
the public, as Ms. Van Nes did not maintain any privacy settings. One friend 
emailed a picture of the post with a message to the plaintiff’s school principal.13
This case is mentioned to illustrate the ease with which defamation can 
be communicated and spread online. Viktor Mayer-Schönberger discusses the 
internet as an “environment of perfect remembering.”14 The permanence of such 
comments, whether because they are still available to view on the site, returned 
on search engine results, screenshot, printed or otherwise shared, makes even 
the most off-the-cuff remark potentially damaging. In the case of Pritchard, the 
damage of the Facebook post was severe, causing the plaintiff to experience stress 
and humiliation, withdraw from his professional and social community, lose his 
love of his career in teaching, and endure harmful comments by members of 
the community.15
This environment of perfect remembering is magnified by search services. 
If the goal is to limit reputational harm, then part of the solution may be to 
remove the defamatory comment from search results to diminish its permanence 
and reach (as a link to the content would no longer be indexed in a search 
database). For instance, one can pay a reputation service to scrub certain content 
from search results. While such a solution can be effective, it is also imperfect 
and impermanent.16 If a legal avenue is sought, as was the case in Niemela v 
Malamas,17 the controversial debate largely centres on worldwide delisting (from 
all Google search services) versus more local delisting, such as from www.google.
10. Ibid at para 41.
11. Ibid at paras 23, 75.
12. Ibid at para 24.
13. Ibid at para 26.
14. Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2009).
15. Pritchard, supra note 8 at paras 33-38.
16. There are many online reputation management companies, such as Reputation.ca 
(Canadian-based) and ReputationDefender (American-based).
17. Niemela v Malamas, 2015 BCSC 1024 [Niemela].
LAIDLAW,  ONLINE DEFAMATION DISpUTES 167
ca.18 In Niemela, the facts did not support worldwide delisting of the defamatory 
content from Google search results—over 90 per cent of the searches for the 
plaintiff were from Canadian IP addresses.19
Such an order would not be enforceable in the United States in light of 
the Communications Decency Act (CDA)20 and the  Securing the Protection of 
our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage (SPEECH) Act.21 Unless 
a Canadian judgment can be directly enforced against a US intermediary, 
or an intermediary voluntarily complies, these intermediaries are, practically 
speaking, out of reach. The result is that Canadian law, however crafted, does 
not translate easily to resolve disputes in the online context, because many online 
platforms are American-based.22
As the few examples above illustrate, resolving disputes in an area like 
defamation law is challenging. There are a few reasons for this. First, the lens 
through which reputation was historically analyzed is strained by the networked 
society. Reputation is “a social construct.”23 It is tied to our sense of self-worth, 
and our self-worth is tied to “the perceived level of esteem that we think others 
hold for us.”24 Indeed, our identity and reputation are developed through our 
interactions with others, rather than as something that exists inherently.25 In this 
way, reputation is tied to the communities in which people interact.
18. See e.g. Google Spain SL, Google Inc v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Marios Costeja 
González, (2014) Case C-131/12 (Google Spain); Equustek Solutions v Google Inc, 2017 SCC 
34; Google LLC v Equustek Solutions Inc, No 5:17-cv-04207-EJD (US ND Cali) (issuing a 
temporary injunction, which was later made permanent); Equustek Solutions Inc v Jack, 2018 
BCSC 610 (Google applied to the British Columbia Supreme Court to have the temporary 
injunction set aside, which the court declined to do).
19. Niemela, supra note 17 para 26.
20. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 133-145 (1996) (codified 
as amended at 47 USC § 223 (1934)).
21. Securing the Protection of Our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act, Pub L No 
111-223, 124 Stat 2380 [SPEECH Act]; see Niemela, supra note 17 at paras 33-35.
22. For Canadian law on intermediary liability, see Emily Laidlaw & Hilary Young, “Internet 
Intermediary Liability in Defamation” (2019) 55 Osgoode Hall LJ.
23. David S Ardia, “Reputation in a Networked World: Revisiting the Social Foundations of 
Defamation Law” (2010) 45 Harv CR-CLL Rev 261 at 267. This article does not explore the 
meaning of reputation, although the LCO report explores it in more depth.
24. Mullis & Scott, supra note 2 at 7. See also Erving Goffman, Interaction Ritual: Essays in 
Face-to-Face Behavior (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982) cited in Robert C Post, “The 
Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution” (1986) 74 Cal L 
Rev 691 at 709.
25. Ardia, supra note 23 at 268-69. See also Laura A Heymann, “The Law of Reputation and the 
Internet of the Audience” (2011) 52 Boston College L Rev 1341 at 1349.
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The wrench in the system is that, historically, communities were more 
isolated. People had different reputations in different communities26 and 
information did not easily cross-pollinate. Defamation law was built around this 
construct of community—that there were social norms that governed behaviour 
in any particular community, that people only interacted with a small group of 
people, and that these groups were separated geographically.27
In the networked society, communities and our portfolio of reputations 
are not as neatly placed in silos. Online communications often involve multiple 
parties, and information is shared across different platforms and contexts. Thus, 
your professional reputation on LinkedIn, friends on Snapchat, strangers on 
Twitter, and so on can bleed together. David Ardia discusses this interconnection 
as a “web of connections [that] leaves impressions, the sum of which comprises 
our reputation.”28
The internet and the “web of connections” it inspires blow a hole in the 
notion of community that has sustained defamation law. A case like Pritchard 
is relatively straightforward in this respect—accusations of pedophilia are 
defamatory in any context and the community was clearly defined, even if the 
impact potentially reached other communities. In other cases, comments that are 
not defamatory in one interactive context, if shared on another platform and in 
another way, can carry a different potential reputational harm.
Second, traditional litigation is ineffective in resolving most defamation 
disputes. In practice, only a sliver of the harms that take place online can be 
remedied.29 Consider that Facebook has 1.7 billion users, Twitter has 320 million 
active users (1.3 billion accounts total), 4Chan has 11 million users, Snapchat 
has 100 million users, Reddit has 36 million accounts, and WhatsApp has 900 
million users.30 On YouTube, users upload approximately 400 hours of video 
every minute,31 and it receives 200,000 flags for content per day.32 On Facebook, 
26. Heymann, supra note 25 at 1349-50. See also Ardia, supra note 23 at 302-03.
27. Ardia, supra note 23 at 302-03.
28. Ibid at 267.
29. Ibid at 305.
30. Kit Smith, “123 Amazing Social Media Statistics and Facts” (2 September 2018), online: 
Brand Watch <www.brandwatch.com/blog/amazing-social-media-statistics-and-facts> 
[perma.cc/VSB2-Q47E].
31. Daphne Keller, “Making Google the Censor,” The New York Times (12 June 2017), 
online: <www.nytimes.com/2017/06/12/opinion/making-google-the-censor.html> 
[perma.cc/W3XY-AESP].
32. See UK, HC, Home Affairs Committee, Oral Evidence: Hate Crime and its Violent 
Consequences (HC 609, 14 March 2017) Q 409 and Q 411 [Home Affairs Committee].
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1.3 million posts are shared every minute33 and approximately two million 
requests are made to Facebook per week to remove content.34 These requests are 
reviewed by Facebook’s approximately 7,500 moderators.35 We do not have the 
data regarding the number of requests made to Twitter, but consider that 500 
million tweets are sent per day,36 and of those subject to a complaint to Twitter, 
only 1 per cent are removed.37 In contrast, Facebook removes 39 per cent of 
reported content, while YouTube removes approximately 90 per cent.38
Although there are many studies on online abuse, most do not isolate 
defamation from other forms of abuse.39 A recent study by the Pew Research Centre 
found that 41 per cent of adults surveyed had been harassed online, of which 50 
per cent had been harassed by strangers. Most of these incidents occurred on 
social networking sites.40 The study found that 26 per cent of adults had untrue 
information posted about them online and 9 per cent experienced emotional or 
mental distress as a result. Of the 26 per cent, half (49 per cent) attempted to 
33. See “Facebook files,” The Guardian (2018), online: <www.theguardian.com/news/series/
facebook-files> [perma.cc/3F52-CAU8]. In particular see Nick Hopkins, “Revealed: 
Facebook’s internal rulebook on sex, terrorism and violence,” The Guardian (21 May 2017), 
online:<www.theguardian.com/news/2017/may/21/revealed-facebook-internal-rulebook-sex-
terrorism-violence> [perma.cc/UY8P-4YD4].
34. Jeffrey Rosen, “The Delete Squad,” The New Republic (29 April 2013), online: <www.
newrepublic.com/article/113045/free-speech-internet-silicon-valley-making-rules> 
[perma.cc/YEA9-CYSD].
35. Alexis C Madrigal, “Inside Facebook’s Fast-Growing Content-Moderation Effort,” 
The Atlantic (7 February 2018), online: <www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/2018/02/what-facebook-told-insiders-about-how-it-moderates-posts/552632> 
[perma.cc/NQ9M-K48T].
36. Internet Live Stats, “Twitter Usage Statistics,” online: <www.internetlivestats.com/
twitter-statistics> [perma.cc/34T3-CYAZ].
37. Home Affairs Committee, supra note 32 at Q 409 and Q 411.
38. Ibid.
39. A select few are: Working to Halt Online Abuse, “Online Harassment/Cyberstalking 
Statistics” (2015), online: <www.haltabuse.org/resources/stats/index.shtml> [perma.
cc/4KSB-Q3K9]; Darcy Hango, “Cyberbullying and cyberstalking among Internet 
users aged 15 to 29 in Canada” (2016), online: The Daily <www150.statcan.gc.ca/
n1/daily-quotidien/161219/dq161219a-eng.htm>; Samuel Perreault, “Self-reported 
Internet victimization in Canada 2009” (2015), online: Statistics Canada <www150.
statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2011001/article/11530-eng.htm>; Rad Campaign, 
“The Rise of Online Harassment” (2014), online: <radcampaign.com/portfolio/
infographics-and-data-visualizations/rise-online-harassment>.
40. Pew Research Center, “Online Harassment 2017” (11 July 2017), online: <www.pewinternet.
org/2017/07/11/online-harassment-2017> [perma.cc/K72W-WGGT].
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have the information removed or corrected. Seventeen per cent of interviewees 
advised the untrue information related to their reputation or character.41
The structure of the internet (an interconnected network of computers) 
creates hurdles to resolution through traditional litigation. As Ardia explains, 
we seek information within the network, but our judicial system is outside this 
network, so it does not have the same influence on our views of one another and the 
world we live in: “[T]he fact that reputational information flows through networks 
makes defamation law’s task of protecting reputation more challenging and its 
remedies less effective.”42 Resolution through the courts is further complicated by 
the disconnect between online communities and courts. Consider Twitter—libel 
cases are difficult for courts to litigate as the norms that govern the space and the 
behaviours that comprise the community of interactions on Twitter are foreign 
to many of the courts hearing the cases.43
The above orients the reader to some of the key problems posed by online 
defamation to effective dispute resolution. They include:
The defendant problem. There might be multiple potential wrongdoers. The 
defendant posted anonymously or pseudonymously (and is not identifiable 
through a Norwich order44 or similar), or the defendant is located out of 
jurisdiction. The problem here is the basic question of who to sue.
The jurisdiction and conflicts of law problem. Defendants and intermediaries are 
sometimes located out of jurisdiction making it more difficult to sue or to enforce 
a judgment. Canadian law cannot be easily deployed to resolve transnational 
online defamation disputes, particularly in the context of intermediary liability 
and American-based companies.
The permanence problem. Once a defamatory post is online, it is almost 
impossible to undo its effects—or, as Ellyn M. Angelotti commented, “the 
toothpaste is out of the proverbial tube.”45 The reputational harms are immortalized.
41. Ibid at 11.
42. Ardia, supra note 23 at 306 [emphasis in original].
43. This was evident in a case of Twitter criminal harassment. See R v Elliott, 2016 ONCJ 35. 
See Ellyn M Angelotti, “Twibel Law: What Defamation and its Remedies Look Like in the 
Age of Twitter” (2013) 13 J High Tech L 430. Angelotti comments: “While the fundamental 
foundation of Twitter is fast, free communication, the traditional remedies for defamatory 
publications remain slow and costly” (ibid at 467).
44. This is a mechanism whereby courts can order a third party to provide documents or 
information that can help assist the plaintiff. See Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise 
Commissioners, [1974] AC 133 (HL (Eng)).
45. Angelotti, supra note 43 at 499. See also Anita Bernstein, “Real Remedies for Virtual 
Injuries” (2012) 90 NCL Rev 1457 at 1484-85 [Bernstein].
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The “network information economy”46 problem. The shift to internet participation 
represents a shift from the one-to-many mass media communications that typified 
our information consumption pre-internet (e.g., newspaper, broadcast), to the 
many-to-many business models of online platforms. Online communications 
often involve multiple parties sharing across various platforms. The notion of 
community is challenged, which is the focal point of assessing reputational harm 
in defamation law.47
The high-volume, low-value problem. All of the problems identified here, 
from the permanence problem to the network information problem, indicate a 
critical hurdle for resolution of these disputes: Most online defamation claims are 
high-volume and low-value. While there is a high volume of defamation online, 
most claims are not worth litigating given the low potential damages and legal 
complexity involved. The end result is that for many who are wronged, there is 
little opportunity for redress.
The traditional litigation problem. Traditional litigation is a minor player in 
online defamation dispute resolution. More commonly, resolution is achieved 
through the intermediary’s terms of use, or by scrubbing content from search 
results. These forms of dispute resolution have little connection to courts. 
Techno-legal solutions, meaning a legal response that involves a technological 
component, emerge as strong methods of dispute resolution. This is observable in 
Manitoba’s Intimate Image Protection Act,48 which focuses on providing support 
for victims of non-consensual distribution of intimate images, including technical 
support through the Canadian Centre for Child Protection (C3P).49
The problems identified above raise critical questions to re-imagining a 
system of dispute resolution: Why do defamation plaintiffs sue, and what outcome 
would be satisfactory for complainants to resolve an online defamation claim?
B. WHAT COMPLAINANTS WANT
Although there are no Canadian empirical studies on why people sue for 
defamation, American studies provide a sense of what motivates Canadian 
litigants. These studies answer key questions about the outcomes sought by 
46. See Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Network: How Social Production Transforms Markets and 
Freedom (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007). For a discussion of this topic in the 
context of defamation, see Ardia, supra note 23 at 262.
47. Ardia, supra note 23 at 282.
48. SM 2015, CCSM, c I87.
49. See Canadian Centre for Child Protection (2018), online: <www.protectchildren.ca/app/en> 
[perma.cc/J7ZA-3WM6].
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defamation claimants: Why do plaintiffs sue and what do they want out 
of a libel suit?
In the 1980s, researchers at the Iowa Libel Research Project50 empirically 
studied defamation suits, focusing on lawsuits against the press, asking who sues, 
why they sue, and why a news organization would allow a dispute to escalate 
to litigation.51 Note here that since the focus was on lawsuits against the press, 
the results might not be generalizable to all defamation suits. The key takeaway 
from the Iowa Project is that most defamation claimants are driven to sue for 
non-pecuniary-interests. Randall P. Bezanson, one of the original researchers, 
summarized the findings as follows:
Our study has led us to four basic conclusions [three of which are relevant to this 
paper]. First, libel plaintiffs do not sue for the sole purpose of obtaining a formal 
judicial remedy for reputational harm. They mainly sue to restore their reputation 
by setting the factual record straight, and this objective is accomplished in significant 
degree independent of the judicial result in the case. Second, money damages do not 
compensate libel plaintiffs. Indeed, money seems rarely to be the reason for suing. 
Most plaintiffs sue to correct the record and to get even. Third, the judicial decision 
in a libel suit does not reflect a fair and full determination of reputational harm or 
of the truth, falsity, or uncertainty of the published statement. These issues are rarely 
addressed and even more rarely decisive in litigation.52
The above creates the possibility that forms of dispute resolution other than 
traditional litigation could potentially resolve disputes at less expense.53 Indeed, 
of those interviewed, the overwhelming majority would consider alternatives 
for resolution—70 per cent would consider it, and a further 13 per cent would 
consider it with certain qualifications.54
The results may be even more striking in the Canadian context, given the fact 
that libel litigation at the time of the study was relatively inexpensive (with 80 per 
cent on contingency fee arrangements). Indeed, Bezanson identified this as one 
of the reasons plaintiffs sue despite the fact that less than 10 per cent of media 
50. There are several publications related to this project, but this article focuses on a select few.
51. Randall P Bezanson, “Libel Law and the Realities of Litigation: Setting the Record Straight” 
(1985) 71 Iowa L Rev 215 at 226 [Bezanson, “Libel Law”].
52. Ibid at 227.
53. This was Robert M Ackerman’s interpretation. See “Defamation and Alternative Dispute 
Resolution: Healing the Sting” (1986) Disp Resol J 1 at 7.
54. Randall P Bezanson, “The Libel Suit in Retrospect: What Plaintiffs Want and What Plaintiffs 
Get” (1986) 74 Cal L Rev 789 at 800-803 [Bezanson, “Libel Suit in Retrospect”].
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libel claims are successful in court.55 This is significant to the extent that the more 
expensive litigation is, the more attractive alternative resolution models will be.56
While much has changed in the world since the 1980s, and while the study 
is focused on American litigants, I view this study as a compelling analysis that 
counters the assumed narrative of libel judgments. Indeed, this type of approach 
informed some of the defamation reform proposals in the United Kingdom that 
are detailed more in Part II.
One qualification relates to youth. In a 2017 study, Jane Bailey and Valerie 
Steeves interviewed twenty individuals between the ages of 15 to 21.57 The 
study participants saw the law as “a last resort”58 for resolving their reputational 
harm, preferring other forms of dispute resolution. In their view, a legal response 
would not de-escalate the conflict, resolve the social and emotional aspect of the 
harm, mend their reputation or change the behaviour, and would be costly and 
slow.59 Thus, participants preferred community-based resolution, followed by 
reporting to social media providers or schools.60 In Bailey and Steeves’s view, law 
reform should focus on supporting community-based resolution mechanisms, 
improving platform regulatory structures, and improving education, with direct 
legal intervention reserved for the most serious situations.61
The concerns expressed by youth inform my thinking here more generally. 
In particular, containment and erasure most reflect what youth are seeking, 
including privacy in resolving their problem—whether it is suing or complaining 
anonymously,62 resolving it through a notice to the social networking provider, 
or containing the spread of the information by erasure of the content as 
much as possible.
The goals of complainants and challenges of the internet present an 
opportunity for more wholesale reform of how online defamation disputes 
are resolved. Certainly, the weaknesses of traditional litigation are exposed, 
55. Bezanson, “Libel Law,” supra note 51 at 228.
56. See Ackerman, supra note 53 at 7-8, n 35.
57. Jane Bailey & Valerie Steeves, “Defamation Law in the Age of the Internet: Young People’s 
Perspectives” (November 2017), Law Commission of Ontario, online: <www.lco-cdo.
org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Defamation-Consultation-Paper-Eng.pdf> [perma.cc/
LCE6-XZYA]. On cyberbullying see Shaheen Shariff, Sexting and Cyberbullying: Defining the 
Line for Digitally Empowered Kids (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015) at 115.
58. Bailey & Steeves, supra note 57 at 46.
59. Ibid at 62-66.
60. Ibid at 46.
61. Ibid at 93-95.
62. See e.g. AB v Bragg Communications Inc, 2012 SCC 46; Jane Doe 464533 v ND, 2016 ONSC 
541 (default judgment set aside, awaiting re-trial: 2017 ONSC 127).
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prompting the question of whether there are ways to either improve that system 
or to resolve disputes in a different way that better meets the outcomes sought 
by complainants.
II. REFORMING DISPUTE RESOLUTION
At the moment, a complainant’s options are limited. One can seek resolution 
through traditional litigation or can make a complaint to the intermediary 
based on the terms and conditions of use. There is a chasm between these two 
options with minimal remedial mechanisms, court-based or private, creating a 
hurdle to access to justice. Based on Part I, certain features of resolution emerge 
as important. First, speedy resolution is critical, because information spreads 
quickly and easily. Second, accessibility of resolution is important, in terms of cost 
and ease of use of the process.63 Third, containment and avoidance of disputes 
are key. Given the risk that online defamation spreads quickly and disputes 
escalate equally as fast, the facilitation of resolution that arrests further harm and 
de-escalates is preferable. This highlights many things as important to resolution, 
such as technical solutions like erasure, reaching the right communities and using 
the discursive64 nature of the internet in the resolution procedure. Finally, there 
is a rehabilitative aspect to the restoration of reputation by healing the dignitary 
or other harm.65
Using the above as a blueprint, in this Part, I examine three aspects to dispute 
resolution: (1) reform to existing methods of resolving defamation disputes, 
which I view as tweaks to the traditional system; (2) ODR as more wholesale 
reform to methods of resolving online disputes; and (3) company-level dispute 
resolution and ways to conceptualize and incentivize intermediaries in this role.
A. TRADITIONAL DEFAMATION REFORM
Traditional litigation for the tort of defamation has always been an uneasy fit. 
The traditional goals of tort actions are compensating the plaintiffs for the 
harm they have suffered and signalling to defendants that their behaviour fell 
63. Bernstein, supra note 45 at 1484 (identifying four goals for online defamation dispute 
resolution, which complement the above: “containment, erasure, rehabilitation, and 
lowered costs”).
64. Mullis & Scott, supra note 2 at 19-21 (discursive remedies).
65. Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 SCR 1130 at para 107 (dignity is especially 
important in Canadian defamation law). See also Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd and 
Others, [1999] UKHL 45 at para 43 (in the United Kingdom, “[r]eputation is an integral 
and important part of the dignity of the individual”); Bernstein supra note 45 at 1484-85.
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below an acceptable standard.66 Defamation law struggles to fit within this 
paradigm, because of the underlying concern that imposing liability might have 
a chilling effect on freedom of expression.67 More generally, court proceedings 
can be lengthy, costly, uncertain, and formal; judges are often not experts in 
the particular field of law at issue; and proceedings are public, adversarial, and 
difficult to litigate or enforce if they involve parties from other jurisdictions.68
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), in contrast, is advantageous 
concerning, among other things, speed, cost, flexibility of proceedings and 
outcomes, and amenability to international disputes, while also being a less 
adversarial approach that requires less involvement of expert facilitators.69 More 
fundamentally, ADR provides an opportunity to resolve a defamation dispute 
by focusing on the interests of the parties more than their rights.70 In practice, 
it focuses on the interest of the defamation claimant to clear their name, or the 
interest of the journalist to be accurate.71 This might align with the interest of 
claimants to right a reputational wrong.72
ADR, in the form of mediation, negotiation, or arbitration,73 is given some 
prominence in this article in light of the goal of defamation complainants to 
restore their reputation. Further, the outcomes and mechanisms identified do 
not necessarily need to be deployed by courts. Since key features in the resolution 
of online disputes are speed, containment, erasure, and lowered-costs, other 
regulatory models become interesting to explore.
66. Marc A Franklin, “A Declaratory Judgment Alternative to Current Libel Law” (1986) 74 Cal 
L Rev 809 at 811.
67. Ibid. See also Mullis & Scott, supra note 2 at 13 (objectives of damages in British libel law “to 
compensate for distress, hurt and humiliation; to compensate for unquantifiable, presumed 
reputation harm; to compensate for actual (provable) harm; and to vindicate or restore the 
claimant’s damaged reputation”).
68. Faye F Wang, Online Dispute Resolution: Technology, Management and Legal Practice from an 
International Perspective (Amsterdam: Chandos Publishing, 2008) at 27-28.
69. Ibid.
70. Ackerman, supra note 53 at 24.
71. Ibid.
72. The Alternative Libel Project, A Final Report on the Problems Created by Defamation Procedure 
with Recommendations for Change (2012), online: <www.englishpen.org/wp-content/
uploads/2012/03/Alternative_Libel_Project_FinalMarch2012.pdf> [perma.cc/EM95-8Z8V] 
[ALP] (90 per cent of defamation cases that were mediated led to settlement).
73. See Susan Blake, Julie Browne & Stuart Sime, A Practical Approach to Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, 4th ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016) at para 1.11. ADR does not 
have a single definition and not all agree on the types of dispute resolution that are ADR. 
To some, arbitration is not ADR because it is a regulated system, nor is negotiation, because 
it narrowly involves lawyers and clients. In this article, a broad definition is used.
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However, I view traditional litigation as integral to resolving defamation 
disputes. Traditional litigation has many advantages. Among other things, 
it “inspires the respect of society,”74 is publicly accountable, can produce 
a judgment, and is enforceable with a great range of remedial powers; it has 
rules and procedures to ensure a fair trial;75 and trials can be “cathartic.”76 For 
some defamation complainants, traditional litigation is the appropriate route 
for resolving disputes where a judgment by a court carries a formal authority 
and public signalling important to the claimant. The problem is that traditional 
litigation is not suitable for most defamation claimants, in particular, those 
seeking to resolve online disputes. So, in exploring the potentiality of other 
forms of reform, the goal is for such mechanisms to be complementary to 
traditional court actions.
Over the years, many proposals have been made to reform mechanisms for 
resolving defamation disputes (non-specific to online defamation), particularly 
in the United Kingdom as part of its reform of defamation law. Proposals can 
be broken down into two, sometimes overlapping, variations: (1) streamlined 
processes and (2) alternative systems, either court-based or private.
One category of streamlined processes involves early intervention. This can 
take the form of early neutral fact-finding77 wherein a factual finding is made 
as to, for example, the falsity of the publication. Another form is early neutral 
evaluation, which enlists a judge or facilitator to evaluate the chances of success 
of the case. The latter is available for use in the United Kingdom to resolve 
construction disputes,78 although there has been little take-up, despite its success 
when used.79 Other proposals for defamation reform directly concern streamlined 
court processes. They include stricter case management, mediation, arbitration, 
or costs penalties for unreasonable refusal of ADR.80
Ireland’s Defamation Act81 includes a two-track process whereby claimants 
can elect to pursue an expedited declaratory order that the statement is false 
74. Ibid at para 1.01.
75. Ackerman, supra note 53 at 26. Ackerman, in this context, notes that trials can be cathartic 
for those involved and that trials are especially appropriate when, for example, facts 
are in dispute.
76. Blake, Browne & Sime, supra note 73 at paras 1.01-1.02.
77. Ackerman, supra note 53 at 20-23. Ackerman, for example, suggests a streamlined 
fact-finding process by using a special verdict (see ibid at 10-15).
78. ALP, supra note 72 at 1, 13-14.
79. Ibid at 29.
80. Ibid at 9, 15-16.
81. Defamation Act 2009 (UK).
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and defamatory.82 The catch is that the claimant foregoes a claim for damages.83 
Another compelling version of a two-track model is proposed by Alastair Mullis 
and Andrew Scott. They recommend triaging cases, with complex cases going to 
the High Court and other cases going through a simplified, fast-track option.84
Other proposals for defamation reform focus on creating specialized courts 
or tribunals. For example, one suggestion is an adjudication model,85 where a 
privately funded adjudicator would make a decision that is non-binding on the 
parties. Parties can be compelled to use the procedure by mandating it through 
legislation as a prerequisite to filing a claim, or it can be voluntary.86
Another option is a specialized court, which would operate similarly to 
traditional court actions, except that the judge would be a specialist in defamation 
law, and trials could be limited in length, cost, and evidence. Complex cases 
could be transferred to a traditional court. One model is the United Kingdom’s 
Patents County Court.87 Such a model would not transfer easily to a Canadian 
context, where not as many judges are experts in defamation law and we do not 
necessarily have the population base to sustain such a bricks and mortar court. 
If, for example, one court were set up in Toronto, which is the only city where 
such a court would be sustainable, this would limit access for anyone outside 
the Greater Toronto Area. Therefore, a tribunal would be more workable in a 
Canadian context.88 Such a tribunal could be self-funded through claim fees.
The problem with some of the suggestions explored in this section is that, 
for the most part, they do not provide a techno-legal resolution. Authors such 
as Ardia, Angelotti, and Bernstein advocate such techno-legal solutions and Part 
I helped identify why such forms of resolution are increasingly important to 
resolve online disputes. There were two similar streams to Ardia and Angelotti’s 
recommendations. First, the authors emphasized the value of speedy resolution89 
focused on reliable information, such as flagging content as disputed,90 
82. Ibid, s 28.
83. Ibid, s 28(2).
84. Mullis & Scott, supra note 2 at 18-19.
85. ALP, supra note 72 at 25.
86. Ibid at 25-26.
87. Ibid at 27.
88. Ibid at 28.
89. Ardia, supra note 23 at 318; Angelotti, supra note 43 at 467.
90. Ardia, supra note 23 at 318; Alastair Mullis & Andrew Scott, “Tilting at Windmills: The 
Defamation Act 2013” (2014) 77 Mod L Rev 87. See also Frank Pasquale, “Rankings, 
Reductionism, and Responsibility” (2006) 54 Clev St L Rev 115; Frank Pasquale “Asterisk 
Revisited: Debating a Right of Reply on Search Results” (2008) 3 J Bus & Tech L 61. 
In these articles, Pasquale develops the idea of a right of reply and the use of asterisks.
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or procedures to contextualize information for accuracy or to correct false 
information.91 Second, they advocated the deployment of these types of solutions 
within the online communities. Not surprisingly, intermediaries were earmarked 
as in a good position to do this, because of their capacity to regulate users.92 
Anita Bernstein proposes a techno-legal solution through the courts, suggesting a 
court-based arbitration scheme that is elective and non-binding combined with a 
technical solution, such as a remediator, to expunge material from the internet.93
Further, while these proposals are promising tweaks to the system of dispute 
resolution, I question whether an opportunity for fundamental reform might be 
missed if one of these solutions were to be selected. Admittedly, this article seeks 
to re-imagine the system from scratch, but traditional reform proposals either 
miss the networked information core of the online defamation problem or were 
not designed with that specifically in mind. This invites consideration of another 
proposal for reform, such as ODR, as it better facilitates techno-legal solutions 
and reaches the online communities where the harm took place.
B. ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
ODR refers to the use of technology to resolve legal disputes.94 An instructive 
definition of ODR is as follows: “[T]he integration and use of technology in the 
process of dispute resolution, whether judicial or extrajudicial.”95 ODR ranges 
from technical support, such as online filing or document management systems, 
to more formalized legal institutions, such as the movement online of tribunals 
or courts. Thus far, ODR has flourished in the private sector. Part of the reason 
is market-driven: Businesses must deliver the holy trinity of trust, convenience, 
and expertise or users will go elsewhere.96
However, Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy note that the pressure is mounting 
on government, because of what they describe as “liquid expectation”97—the 
bleeding over of experiences from one area, such as the use of resolution tools 
on eBay or Amazon, to expectations in other arenas, such as dealings with the 
91. Ardia, supra note 23 at 320-21.
92. Ibid.
93. See e.g. Bernstein, supra note 45 at 1487-89.
94. See generally Wang, supra note 68. See also Julia Hörnle, Cross-border Internet Dispute 
Resolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
95. Alexandre Thibeault & Antoine Guilmain “ODR Initiatives: Evaluation” (2013) CyberJustice 
Laboratory, Working Paper No 7, online: <www.cyberjustice.ca/files/sites/102/WP007_
ODR-_Evaluation_en.pdf> [perma.cc/VBZ3-JWQT]; see Wang, supra note 68 at 25.
96. Katsh & Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 3 at 152.
97. Ibid.
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public sector.98 Online resolution tools in the public sector range from online 
tools to streamline court processes, such as Australia’s eCoutroom, which allows 
the submission of documents and communication online,99 to online courts. 
In the United States, for example, ODR was introduced to mediate railroad and 
airline disputes, and online processes are being used by the National Mediation 
Board.100 Online courts and tribunals now operate in several jurisdictions, 
including Michigan, Ohio, Puerto Rico, Australia, and Canada.101
 ODR has great potential to achieve the kinds of resolution defamation 
claimants seek. However, the lack of a contractual relationship, in most cases, 
between the complainant and the defendant in the context of a defamation 
claim impacts the potential enforceability of an ODR framework. Rather, the 
contractual relationship, if any, is usually with the intermediary through the 
terms of service. Part II(C) explores how to incentivize intermediary frameworks 
or capitalize on that contractual relationship to encourage dispute resolution.
In some ways, ODR and ADR share similar advantages over traditional 
litigation. However, the ODR process is potentially less expensive, faster (as there 
no need for physical convergence), more transparent by leaving a digital trail 
(although this also creates a privacy vulnerability), and more flexible.102 It also 
addresses geographic and economic barriers, both of which impact access to 
justice. For example, some complainants are located in rural areas creating hurdles 
to accessing courts, or the type of dispute is not one for which complainants 
typically sue, such as low-value e-commerce claims. Thus, ODR opens up an 
avenue for redress.103
ODR has potential drawbacks. The United Kingdom Advisory Group 
recommended that ODR is not suitable to all disputes, and is best deployed for 
high-volume, low-value disputes.104 But low-value does not necessarily translate 
98. Ibid at 152-53.
99. Ibid at 158-59.
100. The National Mediation Board uses an online tool called STORM to facilitate the 
brainstorming of resolutions. For a discussion of the tool see ibid at 150-51, ch 6; Lori 
Clarke et al, “A Process-Driven Tool to Support Online Dispute Resolution” University 
of Massachusetts Technology Report: online <laser.cs.umass.edu/techreports/07-05.pdf> 
[perma.cc/ED9H-VEQQ].
101. See Wang, supra note 68 at 25.
102. Ibid at 28-29.
103. Council of Europe, PA, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Access to Justice 
and the Internet: Potential and Challenges, Doc 13918, by Jordi Xuclà (2015) at 8-9 [Access to 
Justice and the Internet].
104. ODRAG, supra note 4 at 5.
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to “legal simplicity.”105 Online defamation has the unfortunate position of being 
legally complex, high-volume and often low-value.
Relatedly, there might be concern that technology-facilitated resolution will 
be impersonal for resolution of these kinds of disputes, particularly if there is 
no human facilitator involved. However, human–computer interaction in the 
context of ODR can operate similarly to human–human interactions. As Darin 
Thompson explains:
Researchers have found that human–computer interactions follow patterns similar to 
human–human equivalents. Users may be aware they are interacting with machines, 
but still tend to follow human–human social rules, and treat computers as if they 
have feelings. Humans can become angry towards computers, and may be flattered 
or feel praised by them. Humans recognize computers cannot think or feel emotion, 
yet still follow human–human social patterns unconsciously. These manifestations 
are not limited to systems that take on anthropomorphic characteristics; research 
suggests they occur even with basic textual interfaces.106
This means that technology can play a critical role in delivering the resolution 
needs of humans, including emotional needs. A properly designed ODR system, 
such as using a carefully crafted questionnaire, can “help users investigate and 
better understand their emotions in a dispute, along with the underlying interests 
to which they relate.”107
More general concerns about ODR are that the use of technology will 
marginalize vulnerable populations who do not have access to it,108 technical 
difficulties will make it difficult to use,109 it might favour repeat players familiar 
with the procedures and mediators involved,110 it might create a privacy 
vulnerability for users,111 and users might not understand or trust the system.112 
Despite these concerns, the immense potential of ODR has spurred a growing 
movement towards its implementation both internally by companies seeking to 
105. Access to Justice and the Internet, supra note 103 at 9.
106. Darin Thompson, “Creating New Pathways to Justice Using Simple Artificial Intelligence 
and Online Dispute Resolution” (2015) 1 Online Disp Res 4 at 45.
107. Ibid at 46.
108. Access to Justice and the Internet, supra note 103 at 11.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid at 12.
111. Ibid at 13; Angelotti, supra note 43 at 490-91.
112. Angelotti, supra note 43 at 490-91 (on trust). See also the story of eQuibby: Robert 
Ambrogi, “Online Dispute Resolution Site eQuibbly Shuts Down” (7 March 2016), 
LawSites, online: <www.lawsitesblog.com/2016/03/online-dispute-resolution-site-equibbly-
shuts-down.html> [perma.cc/WW9P-J8PU]; Access to Justice and the Internet, supra note 103 
at 12-13 (governments can play a role in educating the public and accrediting providers).
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resolve complaints, and through government initiatives to create ODR providers, 
minimum standards,113 online courts,114 or tribunals.115
The key features of an ODR system include convenience, expertise, 
trust,116 accountability,117 transparency, confidentiality,118 and enforcement.119 
Enforceability is problematic for the resolution of online defamation disputes 
where the losing party might simply refuse to comply with an outcome 
and the dispute resolution body has minimal enforcement powers. Direct 
self-enforcement is evident in some privately-run ODR systems. For example, 
domain names disputes are resolved through a private dispute resolution provider 
with the power to direct a transfer of the domain name.120 Here, the dispute 
provider “control[s] the resources at play.”121 As one interviewee commented, 
“a dispute resolution tribunal [for defamation] is a great idea in theory, but in 
practice it requires enforcement mechanisms built in and an identity system built 
in. The domain name system has both, but defamation has neither.” Other forms 
of enforcement might be, as Wang outlines: “[P]ayment system escrow, a refund 
system, a transaction insurance system and technological constraints.”122
Alternatively, indirect enforcement of a defamation decision is possible. 
An indirect form of enforcement is where the losing party is incentivized to 
voluntarily comply through “the use of trustmarks, reputation management 
and rating systems, publicly accessible reports, exclusion of participants from 
marketplaces, and payments for delay in performance.”123 Jordi Xuclà advocates 
for indirect mechanisms including trustmarks to overcome enforcement 
113. EC, Directive 2013/11/EU on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending 
Regulation  No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC [2013] OJ, L 165/6 [ADR Directive].
114. See e.g. HM Courts & Tribunals Service, “Money Claim Online,” online: <www.
moneyclaim.gov.uk/web/mcol/welcome> [perma.cc/L9YY-RY77] [Money Claim] (pilot 
online court); Wang, supra note 68 at 25.
115. See British Columbia’s Civil Resolution Tribunal, discussed in Part II.
116. Ethan Katsh & Janet Rifkin, Online Dispute Resolution: Resolving Conflicts in Cyberspace, (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2001); Katsh & Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 3 at 37-38.
117. Wang, supra note 68.
118. Ibid at 83 (identifying a tension between transparency and the need for confidentiality).
119. See Katsh & Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 3; Wang, supra note 68 at 83.
120. See CIRA, “CDRP process and decisions,” online: <cira.ca/legal-policy-compliance/
cdrp-process-and-decisions> [perma.cc/9LXY-L4WT] [CIRA].
 For discussion of the CDRP process, see Teresa Scassa & Michael Detrubide, Electronic Commerce 
and Internet Law in Canada, 2nd ed (Toronto: CCH Canadian Limited, 2012) at 313-35.
121. Wang, supra note 68 at 83.
122. Ibid at 83-84.
123. Ibid at 84.
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issues in the e-commerce context,124 and to encourage compliance with ODR 
decisions.125 In a defamation context, indirect self-enforcement mechanisms are 
similarly viable. For example, a decision could be publicly accessible, for instance 
published on the ODR website or in the community where the defamation was 
communicated. Or, the decision could be used to effect notice and takedown 
(NTD), which means notice would be given to intermediaries to remove 
unlawful content.126
To conceptualize how ODR might be deployed in a defamation 
context, I explore ODR in three case studies: (1) company-led (eBay); (2) 
government-pushed (European ADR Directive127); and (3) government-created 
(British Columbia’s Civil Resolution Tribunal128).
1. COMpANy-LED
eBay’s drive for developing its dispute resolution model is to build trust in its 
online marketplace. Its dispute resolution system now resolves 60 million disputes 
per year129 through a variety of means. For informal, or “soft” ODR, eBay uses 
a feedback system. Buyers are invited to review aspects of the transaction, 
including seller performance. This is viewable by the public and combined with 
other reviews to create a feedback score. Abuse of the feedback system can create 
dispute resolution needs, but the system itself is designed to avoid disputes. eBay 
also offers a “Seal Membership.” For a small fee, eBay sellers who commit to 
abide by a selling standard, and provide their identity and address, can have a 
trust seal posted as an icon on eBay linked to their seller identification. The icon 
is controlled by SquareTrade, a private ODR provider that eBay uses exclusively. 
SquareTrade can remove the seal at any time if the seller fails to abide by its 
selling standards.130
For a formalized, or “hard” ODR system, eBay offers two services: (1) 
technology-assisted negotiation; and (2) if the dispute is not resolved at this stage, 
124. In general, a “trustmark” is a seal, logo or something similar used by platforms in the 
e-commerce sector to indicate that a seller is trustworthy. See the discussion on eBay below 
in Part II(B)(1).
125. Access to Justice and the Internet, supra note 103 at 12.
126. For further information on NTD, see Laidlaw & Young, supra note 22.
127. ADR Directive, supra note 113.
128. See Part II.
129. Colin Rule, “Quantifying the Economic Benefits of Effective Redress: Large E-Commerce 
Data Sets and the Cost-Benefit Case for Investing in Dispute Resolution” (2012) 34 U Ark 
Little Rock L Rev 767 at 768. See Katsh & Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 3 at 4.
130. Wang, supra note 68 at 66-67.
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then it can be escalated to a human mediator.131 Rarely do eBay disputes escalate 
to the second stage: Eighty-five per cent of disputes are resolved using software.132 
Ultimately, if a resolution is not achieved, eBay offers an adjudication service, 
which is enforceable using its Money Back Guarantee.
Most eBay disputes concern transactions, unlike the relational nature of 
defamation disputes. For disputes concerning the feedback system, which can 
involve allegations of defamatory reviews, eBay uses “Net Neutrals.” This design 
is instructive for online defamation disputes in general. The ‘Independent 
Feedback Review’ process, as it is called, is led by a trained, neutral third party 
who reviews the information submitted by the parties, considers new arguments, 
and then decides whether the feedback should be removed based on a set of 
criteria. From start to finish, the process takes seven days. While the dispute is in 
progress, eBay removes the review.133
eBay has taken novel approaches on many fronts concerning dispute 
resolution. As Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy explain, eBay designed a system, not a 
tool: “[I]t introduced the concept of an ODR system as opposed to an ODR tool. 
In an ODR system, data is generated that reveals patterns of disputes and provides 
opportunities to both facilitate and monitor consensual agreements, thus making 
disputes in the future less likely.”134 A database of decisions is created, which 
helps users see the provider as accountable. The data also provides a source for 
empirical research helping the provider identify trends and flaws in the system 
to make changes.135 For example, one study of eBay’s dispute resolution system 
revealed that use of eBay increased regardless of the outcome of a dispute 
resolution process.136 For the author of the study, Colin Rule, the key takeaway 
was that trust is key for online services, and “[r]esolution is a core component 
of user trust.”137 The larger message is that this data provides feedback to help 
improve a dispute resolution system, whether on the level of a single company, 
or through an online tribunal.
131. Katsh & Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 3 at 34.
132. Darin Thompson, “The Growth of Online Dispute Resolution and Its Use in British 
Columbia” (delivered at the British Columbia Civil Litigation Conference, 2014) 
[Thompson, “Growth of ODR”].
133. ODRAG, supra note 4 at 12.
134. Katsh & Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 3 at 35 [emphasis in original].
135. Wang, supra note 68 at 66-67.
136. Rule, supra note 129 at 772.
137. Ibid at 774.
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2. GOVERNMENT-pUSHED
Another option is to push for the use of ODR to settle defamation disputes 
through legislative reform. Such legislative initiatives can include encouraging 
disputants or online platforms to use ODR, mandating that online platforms 
provide ODR, setting standards for ODR, or creating ODR bodies. An example 
of government-pushed ADR and ODR is the European Union’s Directive on 
alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes (ADR Directive),138 which 
focuses on both offline and online consumer disputes, as well as the related 
Regulation on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes (ODR Regulation),139 
which implements an ODR platform for online consumer disputes. Notably, the 
ODR Regulation’s focus is limited to small e-commerce transactions rather than 
the kinds of disputes analyzed in this article.
The ADR Directive and ODR Regulation work in two ways concerning 
online consumer disputes. First, the ODR Regulation sets up a free, interacting 
ODR platform, which is operated by the European Commission.140 The platform 
does not itself provide ODR services. Rather, it is a portal through which to 
launch a complaint and find an approved ADR provider.141 While the use of the 
ODR platform is voluntary, businesses must provide a link to the platform on 
their website.142 Second, the ADR Directive sets minimum quality standards at 
a state level for ADR providers (related to both offline and online disputes).143 
The Directive requires Members States to create a monitoring authority for 
certified ADR providers.144 The United Kingdom appointed the Trading 
138. ADR Directive, supra note 113. See European Commission, A coherent framework for 
building trust in the Digital Single Market for e-commerce and online services, COM (2011) 
942. See generally, “Alternative and Online Dispute Resolution,” online: European 
Commission <ec.europa.eu/consumers/solving_consumer_disputes/non-judicial_redress/
adr-odr/index_en.htm>.
139. EC, Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 
2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 
2006/2004 And Directive 2009/22/EC (Regulation on consumer ODR), [2013] OJ, L 165/1 
[ODR Regulation].
140. “Online Dispute Resolution,” online: European Commission <ec.europa.eu/consumers/
odr/main/index.cfm?event=main.home.show&lng=EN> [perma.cc/33AL-ABBB] [ODR 
Platform]; ODR Regulation, supra note 139.
141. ODR Platform, supra note 140.
142. ODR Regulation, supra note 139, art 14.
143. ADR Directive, supra note 113 at ch II.
144. Ibid, art 20; Access to Justice and the Internet, supra note 103 at 6.
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Standards Authority as the competent authority to monitor ADR providers for 
non-regulated sectors.145
3. GOVERNMENT-CREATED
While the ODR platform is a clear example of government-pushed ODR, its 
focus remains onfacilitating private ADR through setting minimum quality 
standards and improving accessibility.This section investigates the ways more 
formalized institutions of legal decision-making, namely courts and tribunals, 
have moved online. As Lord Justice Briggs commented, “the Online Court is a 
concept for which the time has come.”146 The United Kingdom Advisory Group 
advocated the potentiality of ODR for courts:
[A] legal system and the rule of law itself depend on the existence and widespread 
use of a public court system that applies, clarifies, and develops the law through 
decisions that are authoritative, enforceable, final and can set precedent. However, 
this policy position does not preclude the possibility of judges providing this service 
across the Internet. Nor need it limit the role of the courts to dispute resolution (as 
opposed to dispute containment and dispute avoidance).147
Most relevant here is the Civil Resolution Tribunal (CRT) in British 
Columbia (BC).148 The CRT is a product of the Civil Resolution Tribunal Act.149 
The tribunal currently hears small claims under $5,000 and strata (condominium) 
disputes, and focuses on collaborative problem-solving for disputes.150 As one 
145. Trading Standards Authority, “ADR Approval,” online: <www.tradingstandards.uk/
commercial-services/approval-and-accreditation/adr-approval> [perma.cc/B8W6-XKD2]. 
In regulated industries, existing regulators (e.g., the Gambling Commission or Office of 
Communications (Ofcom)) will monitor and certify ADR providers.
146. UK, Judiciary of England and Wales, Civil Courts Structure Review: Final Report by 
Lord Justice Briggs (2016)  at para 6.44 [Briggs]. Lord Justice Briggs’ report on the Civil 
Courts Structure Review is recommended reading concerning an online court in general, 
specifically paragraph 6.
147. ODRAG, supra note 4 at 26.
148. See Civil Resolution Tribunal Portal <civilresolutionbc.ca>. See also the discussion in Katsh 
& Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 3 at 151-60.
149. Civil Resolution Tribunal Act, SBC 2012, c 25.
150.  There are no financial limits on strata disputes brought before the tribunal. See Shannon 
Salter, “Province of BC Expands Civil Resolution Tribunal’s Jurisdiction” (26 April 2018), 
online: <civilresolutionbc.ca/province-bc-expands-civil-resolution-tribunals-jurisdiction> 
[perma.cc/K8EZ-A8FR] (the British Columbia government proposed expanding the CRT 
remit to certain motor vehicle accident claims). See also Bill 20, The Insurance (Vehicle) 
Amendment Act, 3rd Sess, 41st Leg, British Columbia, 2018.
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of the members of the BC Ministry of Attorney General’s project team, Darin 
Thompson, commented:
We know between 1-2% of cases filed in court will be resolved in trial. It is true 
across Canada, USA, and appears to be the case in England. So, 98% of the time it 
is not resolved in trial. Why would you make people start off that way if you aren’t 
going to end up in that adversarial contest of rights? The BC Ministry of Attorney 
General was inspired to design something that worked for the other 98%.151
A key feature of the CRT is that legal representation is limited, although it 
is permissible for a lawyer to act as a helper.152 Exceptions include children and 
adults for which mental capacity is an issue.153
The CRT operates in four phases: solution explorer, negotiation, facilitation, 
and adjudication.154 In Phase One, the parties use online tools to try to diagnose 
and resolve their problem. The tools include interactive questionnaires and 
information services to help diagnose problems, and self-help services in the form 
of letter templates.
Phase Two is automated negotiation. Here, the parties try to negotiate a 
resolution party-to-party using online tools. Phase Two is initiated with the 
equivalent of filing a statement of claim. However, the emphasis in CRT is 
different. Rather than setting out different arguments to succeed in court, the 
focus is on resolving the problem. Technology facilitates resolution by providing 
tools, such as templates and dropdown menus, which frame the negotiation.155
If the dispute is not yet resolved, then Phase Three introduces human 
facilitators. A tribunal member or case manager leads a mediation, which, 
if successful, can be made into a tribunal order. Phase Four is adjudication and 
the decision has the force of a court order.156 All of this is generally done using 
151. Interview of Darin Thompson (5 June 2017).
152. Civil Resolution Tribunal, “Do I need permission to have a helper?,” online: 
<civilresolutionbc.ca/how-the-crt-works/tribunal-process/starting-a-dispute/
helpers-representation/#do-i-need-permission-to-have-a-helper> [perma.cc/W28T-2H7H].
153. Civil Resolution Tribunal, “Can I have a representative?,” online: <civilresolutionbc.ca/
how-the-crt-works/tribunal-process/starting-a-dispute/helpers-representation/#can-i-have-a-
representative> [perma.cc/7BHW-3P7T].
154. Civil Resolution Tribunal, “Starting a Dispute,” online: <civilresolutionbc.ca/
how-the-crt-works/tribunal-process/#1-starting-a-dispute> [perma.cc/5H4U-7DRK]; Civil 
Resolution Tribunal, “Getting Started,” online: <civilresolutionbc.ca/how-the-crt-works/
getting-started> [perma.cc/7EVQ-VJD6]; see Katsh & Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 3 at 160.
155. Katsh & Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 3 at 160.
156. Ibid.
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the online platform alone, although in-person meetings are also permitted, 
depending on the situation.157
Take-up of the CRT since its launch in July 2016 has been significant. 
As of December 2017, the CRT received 808 applications to resolve strata 
disputes, of which 369 were completed. Since expanding to resolve small claims 
matters in June 2017, the CRT received 2,236 small claims applications, out 
of which 687 were completed. On average, the CRT estimates that it receives 
350-450 new applications monthly.158 Further, the remit continues to expand, 
most recently with the proposal that the CRT resolve certain motor vehicle 
accident claims.159 All the while, like eBay, the CRT analyzes data about the CRT 
system to continuously make improvements.160
The United Kingdom is also developing an online small claims court,161 with 
a pilot version launched by Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service in April 
2018.162 Such a court was proposed by Lord Justice Briggs in his 2016 report 
reviewing the structure of civil courts.163 The details of the United Kingdom 
model do not need to be explored in depth here as conceptually there are many 
similarities with the CRT.164 Two key distinguishing features of this model are 
an online court165 (unlike the tribunal structure of the CRT), and the inclusion 
of lawyers in the process. The current pilot is for small claims matters for fixed 
monetary claims under £10,000.166
157. Thompson, “Growth of ODR,” supra note 132 at 1.1.5.
158. CRT, “Update: Since June 1, 2017 the #CRT has received 2236 small claims applications 
(687 completed). Since July 13, 2016, the CRT has received 808 strata applications 
(369 completed). The CRT now receives about 350-450 new applications for dispute 
resolution each month. #ODR #A2J” (4 Dec 2017 at 12:19), online: Twitter <twitter.com/
CivResTribunal/status/937733030520619008?> [perma.cc/49Z4-J4CH].
159. Salter, supra note 150.
160. See the CRT’s continuous improvement strategy at work, online: Civil Resolution 
British Columbia <civilresolutionbc.ca/solution-explorer-quarterly-update-2017-q4> 
[perma.cc/DT8M-T76T].
161. Briggs, supra note 146; Katsh & Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 3 at 160.
162. HM Courts & Tribunals Service, “Quicker way to resolve claim disputes launched online” (6 
April 2018), online: <www.gov.uk/government/news/quicker-way-to-resolve-claim-disputes-
launched-online> [perma.cc/M6NU-P5T6]; see e.g. Money Claim, supra note 113.
163. Briggs, supra note 146.
164. For further information, see ODRAG, supra note 4; Briggs, supra note 146 at paras 
6.4,  6.108-6.114.
165. Briggs, supra note 146 at paras 6.40-6.41.
166. Money Claim, supra note 114. Note that Lord Briggs’ proposal was for disputes up to 
£25,000. See Briggs, supra note 146 at paras 6.47-6.54.
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The CRT and online court are potentially promising models for resolving 
defamation disputes. Of particular interest are the dispute avoidance and 
containment strategies reflected in the staircase approach, the accessible nature 
of these frameworks, the potential for speed, and remedies oriented to reputation 
corrections more than damages. Two evident hurdles are enforceability and 
legal complexity. The potentiality of an ODR tribunal or court is further 
explored in Part III.
C. THE ROLE OF INTERMEDIARIES
The potentiality of ODR invites closer analysis of the role of intermediaries, 
in particular, the role of social networking providers that host third-party content. 
The remedial mechanism an intermediary deploys is a form of company-level 
ODR. This type of ODR can provide inexpensive access to justice for those 
situations where a resolution within and by the community provides the kind 
of resolution sought. Two aspects must be examined here: the strengths and 
weaknesses of company-level ODR and how to incentivize it.
The biggest hurdle to the use of ODR and company-level ODR in the 
context of defamation claims is that transactional disputes evident in, for 
example, most eBay disputes, fundamentally differ from defamation disputes. 
Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy provide a useful summary of why the resolution of 
transactional disputes is simpler:For one, the feedback systems involved are a 
risk-reduction tool that increases the willingness to interact with someone whom 
the buyer or seller does not know. That, in turn, reduces the likelihood of a 
dispute occurring (although of course there are disputes over feedback ratings 
and there are commercial contexts in which feedback ratings are less effective). 
Second, the kinds of disputes that need to be resolved are limited. Most involve 
something broken, not paid for, not delivered, and so forth. Third, the disputes 
are two-party disputes rather than involving many different parties. It’s also 
difficult for parties to hide who they are, since identities are linked to some 
payment process; similarly, discovering who is at fault is easier with mechanisms 
such as shipment insurance and tracking. And last but far from least, monetary 
exchanges can occur immediately once an agreement is reached.167
Anger can be high in both types of disputes, but anger can more easily be 
managed with transactional disputes (once parties realize there was a mistake 
and so on). With relationship disputes such as defamation, the anger might have 
been building up over time and, as a result, may be more difficult to manage.168 
167. Katsh & Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 3 at 113-14.
168. Ibid at 114.
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Further, the infrastructure itself is designed to resolve transactional disputes. For 
example, credit cards have a chargeback system, whereas social media disputes do 
not have these systems. Rather, the main enforcement tool of social networking 
providers are content removal, account suspension, and similar tactics.
Most e-commerce disputes involve parties living at a distance, thus ODR has 
an obvious value in providing an inexpensive and efficient remedial mechanism. 
Facebook friends are often friends in the offline world, thus in-person resolution 
is possible.169 Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy argue that defamation is an area 
where disputes are easier to resolve in the offline world, and “more effective 
offline processes in schools and other contexts in which there is some spillover 
from disputes that originated online is sorely needed.”170 That said, in a study 
conducted by the Pew Research Centre, 54 per cent of interviewees stated that 
their most recent online harasser was anonymous.171 Unless the harasser can be 
identified, which is not always possible despite the availability of a Norwich 
order, resolution through schools or in similar contexts can be challenging.
Resolution through the intermediaries or courts is not an either/or 
proposition. We know that many social media providers and other platforms 
resolve defamation disputes. We know that some frameworks are better than 
others. To a certain extent, we need these platforms to provide this service 
considering the number of content complaints. The key, then, is in how to 
incentivize quality resolution structures. On the other hand, encouraging 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) does not forego traditional litigation, the 
development of defamation tribunals, ODR through the courts, or similar. 
Instead, these can be complementary. Without access to alternative methods 
to resolve complaints, the reality is that for most people a complaint to the 
intermediary is the end of the process. Arguably, there is an access to justice 
problem based on the definition of access to justice used in this article (dispute 
resolution, avoidance, and containment) if we continue on the same path limited 
to traditional litigation and company-level complaints mechanisms.
The benefit of encouraging company-level mechanisms is that they can 
provide innovative responses to the problems that persist on their platforms. This 
provides the kind of community-level response that Ardia advocated,172 and the 
techno-legal response explored throughout this article. For example, Riot Games 
revamped its dispute resolution procedure for League of Legends, an online 
169. Ibid at 115.
170. Ibid.
171. Pew Research Centre, supra note 40.
172. Ardia, supra note 23.
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game with 67 million active monthly players,173 in response to losing players 
due to online abuse. It assembled a “player behavior team” to study user profiles, 
comprised of psychology, cognitive science, and neuroscience professionals. They 
found as follows:
Persistently negative players were only responsible for roughly 13 percent of the 
game’s bad behavior. The other 87 percent was coming from players whose presence, 
most of the time, seemed to be generally inoffensive or even positive. These gamers 
were lashing out only occasionally, in isolated incidents—but their outbursts often 
snowballed through the community.174
Riot Games targeted community norms. Three innovations helped reduce 
abuse in the game. First, they turned off an automatic chat function, which 
reduced abuse by 30 per cent. Second, they strengthened communication 
concerning abusive behaviour by advising players why they were being punished, 
rather than just the disciplinary measure imposed, which decreased the recidivism 
rate.175 Third, they began involving the community as voluntary members of a 
tribunal, effectively juries, that voted on the appropriate punishment.176
Other intermediaries are experimenting with community-appropriate 
responses. YouTube’s Trusted Flagger program is relatively established (it has 
been active since 2012). Individuals can apply to be flaggers and the content 
they flag is prioritized for review by content moderators.177 A subsidiary of eBay, 
Marketplaats, is experimenting with crowd-sourcing the resolution of feedback 
disputes.178 Facebook created a compassion team to innovate procedures for 
resolving interpersonal disputes.179 It uses social reporting to address offensive 
content that does not breach the Terms of Service (called its Community 
Standards). With social reporting, a user can complain to the offender directly or 
to a trusted friend to facilitate resolution.180 Twitter uses a mute, block, and report 
173. Katsh & Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 3 at 129.
174. Laura Hudson, “Curbing Online Abuse Isn’t Impossible. Here’s Where We Start” (15 
May 2014), online: Wired <www.wired.com/2014/05/-fighting-online-harassment> 
[perma.cc/6TJF-K3BS].
175. Ibid.
176. Katsh & Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 3 at 129.
177. YouTube, “YouTube Trusted Flagger program,” online: <support.google.com/youtube/
answer/7554338?hl=en> [perma.cc/8RYW-FGGU].
178. ODRAG, supra note 4 at 12.
179. Katsh & Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 3 at 113.
180. Facebook, “What is social reporting?,” online: <www.facebook.com/help/
www/128548343894719> [perma.cc/4MUD-PBVV].
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strategy to managing abuse on its service.181 Many platforms are experimenting 
with artificial intelligence to detect and delete terrorism-related speech.182
Despite some of these innovations, there are significant disadvantages to 
self-regulation of content disputes. In my earlier work on this subject, I explored 
these issues from the perspective of CSR and human rights.183 Distilled to the 
relevant points for this article are the following. 
These kinds of corporate regulations are not great for standard setting.
Some platforms provide minimal dispute resolution structures, particularly some 
American-based websites that capitalize on the immunity provided by section 
230 of the CDA. Even where platforms provide dispute resolution mechanisms, 
their frameworks vary wildly. Some may be innovative, illustrated by the examples 
above, but others may fail to reflect the law of defamation in Canada and fail to 
provide clear standards to users as to legal and non-legal behaviour.
One answer might be that users do not have to use Facebook, Snapchat, 
or other social media platforms. However, defamation complaints do not need 
to involve a registered user. As the case of Jones v Dirty World Entertainment 
Recordings LLC184 illustrates, someone might post defamatory content about 
you on thedirty.com, and given the terms of service of that site and the host’s 
immunity under section 230, an individual would likely be unsuccessful in 
having the content removed.
The lack of standard setting means that principles of good regulation that 
one normally expects of public institutions are not normally present online.185 
Enforceability was noted above as an obstacle in defamation disputes. In the 
181. Twitter, “Learn how to control your Twitter experience,” online: <support.twitter.com/
articles/20170134> [perma.cc/FTA5-AB9S]. Note there are significant weaknesses with the 
governance frameworks of some of these social networking providers, which is not explored 
in depth here. See Emily Laidlaw, “What is a Joke? Mapping the path of a speech complaint 
on Social Networks” in Lorna E Gillies & David Mangan, eds, The Legal Challenges of Social 
Media (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017) [Laidlaw, “What is a Joke?”].
182. See e.g. Mark Zuckerberg, “Building Global Community” (16 February 
2017), online: <www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/building-global-
community/10154544292806634> [perma.cc/M5KD-BZUP]; BBC, “Facebook’s AI 
wipes terrorism-related posts” (29 November 2017), online: <www.bbc.com/news/
technology-42158045> [perma.cc/V6F7-M8QX]. This puts aside, for now, the issues 
surrounding automated solutions, namely that they are not yet sophisticated enough to 
analyze context, which is key in identifying lawful versus unlawful speech.
183. Emily Laidlaw, Regulating Speech in Cyberspace: Gatekeepers, Human Rights and Corporate 
Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) [Laidlaw, Regulating Speech].
184. Jones v Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, 755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir 2014).
185. Laidlaw, Regulating Speech, supra note 183 ch 3, 6.
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context of social media, transparency is notably deficient.186 Some SNPs are 
working towards improving their transparency. League of Legends, as detailed 
above, benefitted from clearer communication with users on why their accounts 
were blocked resulting in reduced recidivism. In 2018, Facebook published its 
first transparency report concerning enforcement of its community standards.187
In most cases, once a complaint is made, that is the end of the matter. 
Principles of due process that we expect of a court system, such as notice, a right 
to be heard and to hear the case against you, transparency, a right to confront 
witnesses, and access to a neutral decision maker, are not even notionally 
replicated in most company dispute resolution systems, particularly in the social 
networking context.188
Further, it forces these intermediaries into a pseudo-judicial role.189 For 
example, if a person posts a negative review of a hotel on TripAdvisor and the 
hotel complains to have it removed, how does a content moderator know if 
the review is based on accurate facts or, without more information, how does 
it untangle fact versus opinion? While in certain circumstances the defamatory 
nature of the review might be clear, a difficulty for intermediaries subject 
to NTD, such as in Europe, is identifying at what point the obligation to 
remove content is triggered—on notice of a defamation complaint, once the 
unavailability of defences is exhausted, or once knowledgeable of the strengths or 
weaknesses of a case.190
At a more fundamental level, the voluntary nature of these types of 
CSR frameworks, set down through contractual arrangements with users, 
is problematic. CSR is too dependent on the vision of current management, 
186. Under the leadership of Rebecca McKinnon, Ranking Digital Rights published a Corporate 
Accountability Index in 2015, 2017 and 2018. The 2017 report states: “Companies 
tell us almost nothing about when they remove content or restrict users’ accounts for 
violating their rules.” See Ranking Digital Rights, “2017 Corporate Accountability Index” 
(March 2017) at 29, online: <rankingdigitalrights.org/index2017/assets/static/download/
RDRindex2017report.pdf> [perma.cc/TB8Q-JR6F].
187. Facebook, “Community Standards Enforcement Report” (March 2018), online:  
<transparency.facebook.com/community-standards-enforcement> [perma.cc/YH5T-H7BH]. 
The report was first published in early 2018 on the heels of the Cambridge Analytica scandal.
188. Laidlaw, “What is a Joke?,” supra note 181.  See also the Guardian’s Facebook Files, 
specifically Nick Hopkins, “Revealed: Facebook’s internal rulebook on sex, terrorism 
and violence,” The Guardian (21 May 2017), online: <www.theguardian.com/
news/2017/may/21/revealed-facebook-internal-rulebook-sex-terrorism-violence> 
[perma.cc/C7UW-GWW9].
189. Laidlaw, Regulating Speech, supra note 183 at 243-44.
190. See discussion, Laidlaw & Young supra note 22 at [Production to Insert 
Final Page Numbers].
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making it difficult to develop and sustain standards. This is further problematized 
by the changeable nature of information technology companies and the human 
rights at stake.191
Further, Part I identified that a key outcome for defamation complainants 
is fixing the reputational harm, such as through a correction, retraction, 
or declaration of falsity. This requires some sort of public resolution, which is absent 
from many complaint mechanisms offered by social networking providers. As the 
Ranking Digital Rights Corporate Accountability Index reports, actions taken to 
enforce terms of service were not publicly disclosed by most of the companies 
investigated.192 A more formalized process that is either public or combined with 
technological processes that serve a public communication function (flagging 
disputed content or communicating that content has been removed for infringing 
community standards, et cetera) might serve that objective.
The reality is that given the multi-jurisdictional nature of internet 
communications and disputes, the high costs of litigation, and low value of most 
defamation claims, the rules these platforms create for use of their services are 
virtually the only way to resolve defamation disputes for some people. Elsewhere, 
I describe it as the “law of Facebook” and the “law of Twitter.”193 I have previously 
researched the question, “how can CSR be used to complement other efforts to 
achieve a desired objective?,” which is instructive in how to conceptualize the role 
of intermediaries.194 In my view, companies must regulate their platforms, but 
equally, we need government leadership in providing access to justice through 
systems of resolution.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES TO THE LAW
Several key problems were identified in this article concerning the resolution 
of online defamation disputes, which inform the recommendations. At its 
core is the access to justice hurdle created by the high-volume, low-value, and 
legally complex matrix of defamation disputes. Complainants have two options, 
both of which are deficient. The complainant can pursue traditional remedies, 
as in court actions, but given the nature of online communications (across 
191. Laidlaw, Regulating Speech, supra note 183 at 246-47.
192. Ranking Digital Rights, supra note 186.
193. Laidlaw, “What is a Joke?,” supra note 181.
194. Emily Laidlaw, “Myth or promise? The corporate social responsibilities of online service 
providers for human rights” in Luciano Floridi & Mariarosaria Taddeo, eds, Understanding 
Responsibilities of Online Service Providers in Information Societies (Cham, Switzerland: 
Springer, 2017) at 135.
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different platforms, jurisdictions, involving multiple parties, and spread with 
ease), and the length and cost of litigation, to name a few issues, this route is less 
effective to resolve most disputes. Alternatively, the complainant can complain 
to the intermediary with the goal of content removal or another remedy (reply, 
account deletion or suspension, et cetera). This approach can be effective, but 
company-level dispute resolution mechanisms lack industry standards and due 
process, put intermediaries in a pseudo-judicial role, and are dependent on the 
changeable commitments of current management. This leaves complainants with 
few practical options to resolve their disputes. Other forms of resolution might 
fill the gap, but these are currently underdeveloped.
My recommendations seek to animate the goals of defamation claimants, 
namely to restore their reputation and to set the factual record straight. For 
online disputes, two things are key: Swift, accessible dispute resolution and 
subject matter expertise of caseworkers, adjudicators, and judges. In order to 
achieve these goals, we need to embrace imperfection in whatever regulatory 
structure is devised.
My recommendations consider interviews conducted with industry experts, 
practitioners, and members of the judiciary.195 All interviewees emphasized 
the importance of a speedy process for the resolution of online defamation 
disputes. Of the interviewees questioned about a tribunal or small clams process 
for defamation disputes, the vast majority viewed such a process as a welcome 
method to resolving defamation claims provided that it has one feature: That it 
be a specialized tribunal in the sense that the adjudicator or judge had specialized 
knowledge of defamation law and the internet. NTD complemented by ADR, 
a tribunal or something similar, was advocated by many interviewees.
I conclude that we need a multi-faceted response to resolving defamation 
disputes involving courts, intermediaries, and specialist tribunals. I recommend 
company-incentivized complaints mechanisms coupled with ODR as 
complements to traditional litigation as a combination that goes some way to 
resolving the problems identified.
A. TRADITIONAL LITIGATION AND IMPROVING ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Traditional actions to the court should be maintained and any proposals made 
here ought to be complementary to court actions. For complex claims, courts are 
the appropriate bodies to be deciding the disputes. Further, for some claimants, 
195. The interviews were confidential and I will not be identifying speakers by name. Interviewees 
were all senior members of their profession responsible for law or policy relevant to 
intermediary liability and resolution of defamation disputes.
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in particular claimants for whom monetary damages might be appropriate or 
who have a public profile, traditional litigation is also appropriate. This is because 
traditional actions satisfy the public vindication sought by some claimants who 
wish to “set the record straight.” Given the technicality of defamation law, 
however, this article cautions that cases that proceed to a full determination do 
not generally provide a judgment that reflects a decision on the reputational 
harm, truth of the statement, or similar outcomes that could restore a claimant’s 
reputation.196 Further benefits of traditional litigation include the respect 
associated with courts, the cathartic function of trials, the procedures that ensure 
a fair trial, and the greater range of remedial powers.197
B. LINKING ODR AND THE ROLE OF INTERMEDIARIES
As many interviewees noted, a common first step in addressing a defamation 
problem is to complain to the online platform, such as Facebook or Snapchat, 
or to the news organization that posted the story online (often in relation to the 
comments section). Law reform in the area of intermediary liability is explored 
in more detail with my co-author Hilary Young.198 However, not all defamation 
claims can be solved by complaints to an intermediary for a variety of reasons. 
The intermediary might not remove the content, regardless of what is codified 
in Canadian legislation (an enduring problem of regulatory arbitrage in the 
internet context). The complainant might not be satisfied with NTD, even if 
successful, and may wish to seek further remedies, such as an apology, retraction, 
declaration of falsity or monetary damages. The social harm might be so severe 
for the claimant that they deem other action appropriate or necessary. Indeed, 
NTD is a speedy remedy, but more limited in terms of its potential to bring 
about the outcomes that defamation litigants want. If fixing the reputational 
harm is the goal, NTD only solves part of the problem.
As a result of the weaknesses in traditional litigation and considering the 
limits of intermediaries, I recommend the creation of an ODR tribunal to resolve 
online defamation disputes. Before making the case for this recommendation, 
however, a problem concerning the development of ODR is relevant to 
intermediaries. As was discussed in this article, any Canadian-made mechanism 
to resolve defamation disputes is risky, because it cannot easily force litigants to 
196. See Bezanson, “Libel Law,” supra note 51; Bezanson, “Libel Suit in 
Retrospect,” supra note 54.
197. See discussion in Part II; Blake, Browne & Sime, supra note 73 at paras 1.01-1.02; 
Ackerman, supra note 52 at 26.
198. Laidlaw & Young, supra note 22.
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the table. Some users post defamatory content anonymously or pseudonymously. 
While their identity might be obtained from the intermediary through a Norwich 
order, the wrongdoers are not always identifiable. Alternatively, the defamation 
might be the result of a pile-on and targeting all the wrongdoers is unfeasible. 
Equally, the wrongdoers might be located out-of-country, and a decision of a 
Canadian court might be unenforceable in the United States due to the SPEECH 
Act.199 Or simply, a defendant might not want to participate in a tribunal process 
if it is voluntary.
However, for the kinds of disputes that would be escalated beyond NTD, 
there is often a social harm in the local community that compounds the harm 
online. This might be local to a school, or, as was the case in Pritchard,200 localized 
to the community in which the plaintiff lived and worked. In such a situation, 
there is an identifiable defendant(s) either to sue (as was the case in Pritchard), 
or to seek resolution with by means of an ODR mechanism.
Working models in other fields, such as domain names dispute resolution, 
have built-in direct enforcement powers. Domain names dispute resolution 
providers have a contractual relationship with the domain name owners and 
have the power to cancel or transfer domain names. This is largely absent from 
defamation law. Rather, indirect enforcement powers are more readily available. 
If a defendant refuses to participate in a tribunal process, then the decision 
is public, available on the tribunal website, and usable to seek NTD from an 
intermediary, or to post in a particular group or thread where the defamation 
happened. In short, the decision has an indirect enforcement effect by publicly 
communicating the wrong.
In addition, intermediaries usually have a contractual relationship with their 
users. One option is to model a system on Europe’s ODR platform. For example, 
minimum quality standards might be imposed on intermediary complaints 
mechanisms. Or, a legislative provision can mandate that intermediaries include a 
term in their terms of service that defamation disputes involving a Canadian-based 
claimant, which are not resolved using the internal process, must use the ODR 
tribunal. A softer approach, drawn from the ADR Directive, is to require that 
intermediaries provide a link to the ODR mechanism, effectively advertising 
the ODR tribunal.
199. SPEECH Act, supra note 21.
200. Pritchard, supra note 8.
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Requiring that industry resolve disputes via an adjudicator is observable 
outside the technology sector.201 In the United Kingdom construction industry, 
an adjudication system was introduced “underpinned by legislation” through the 
Construction and Technology court.202 Under the Housing Grants, Construction 
and Regeneration Act,203 a party to the contract can unilaterally refer a dispute to 
adjudication. The scope is limited to certain contractual issues. Another model 
is the Financial Ombudsman Service204 in the United Kingdom, which resolves 
disputes between financial businesses and customers, and has the power to make 
monetary awards.205 Although a decision of the Ombudsman is final, fewer 
than 10 per cent of disputes ever reach that point. If the decision is accepted by 
the consumer, it becomes legally binding.206 This kind of adjudication model 
underpinned by legislation is an imperfect tool, but would provide an avenue for 
resolution that connects the kinds of remedial outcomes defamation claimants 
seek with solutions.
C. CREATION OF AN ONLINE TRIBUNAL
I recommend the creation of a specialized online tribunal for many reasons. First, 
taking into account that reputational harm is a societal harm,207 the lack of access 
to justice for individuals to repair their reputation has great social cost. This invites 
the re-imagining of a system that is more accessible, not just in terms of access 
to the courts, but in re-thinking what is a good remedy for resolving these types 
of disputes. This article takes cues from the United Kingdom’s ODR Advisory 
Group of the Civil Justice Council, which commented, “[t]he temptation to 
which many proposed reformers have succumbed in the past is to believe that the 
201. In the LCO report, other industry regulatory models, such as media regulators, privacy 
commissioners, and domain names regulators, were explored in more depth.
202. Constructing the Team, Final Report of the Government/Industry Review of Procurement and 
Contractual Arrangements in the UK Construction Industry by Sir Michael Latham (London: 
HMSO, July 1994) at 91.
203. Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 (UK), c 53. See also, The Scheme for 
Construction Contracts (England and Wales) Regulations 1998 (UK), SI 1998/649.
204. Financial Ombudsman Service, online: <www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk>.
205. It was created by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK), c 8, Part XVI, Schedule 
17. See “Financial Conduct Authority Handbook,” online: <www.handbook.fca.org.uk/
handbook/DISP> [perma.cc/9U68-TQTS].
206. Financial Ombudsman Service, “Information for businesses covered by the ombudsman 
service,” online: <www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/faq/businesses/answers/rules_a11.html> 
[perma.cc/PSJ7-YUSH].
207. Ardia, supra note 23 at 264.
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best way forward in saving costs and increasing access to justice is to streamline 
our existing system rather than change it fundamentally.”208
Second, the consistent message from the research and interviews was the 
need for access to a form of dispute resolution that was fast and less expensive, 
which tribunals are in a better position to deliver than courts.
Third, access to justice is about more than access to the courts. Rather, 
it includes dispute containment and avoidance. This requires different forms 
of dispute resolution, such as information to diagnose and avoid disputes, 
containment facilitated through a third party to settle or narrow the issues 
in dispute, and techno-legal solutions, such as flagged content and other 
similar approaches.
Fourth, alternative forms of dispute resolution better meet the outcomes 
sought by defamation plaintiffs. While a judgment certainly can provide public 
signalling that restores a reputational harm, I conclude it is insufficient for most 
cases of online defamation. The problem is that for most online defamation, 
claimants do not pursue redress. Both ADR and ODR provide a greater range 
of tools to resolve a defamation claim more quickly, and a tribunal is better 
positioned to deliver the broad access to justice approach of dispute avoidance, 
containment, and resolution discussed in this article.209
Fifth, NTD is a mechanism, not a dispute resolution system. It is a mistake 
to view NTD as anything other than a tool to limit the harm. Fulsome resolution 
of disputes should be available in some means other than costly litigation. 
Alternative approaches were developed in other areas that face high-volume 
consumer disputes such as finance, domain names, and construction. In my view, 
the time has come to offer it to address online defamation disputes.
Sixth, tribunals can be specialized in a way that Canadian courts are not. 
This has multiple benefits in an area like defamation, where the law is technical. 
It expedites the process, creates consistency and provides clarity to litigants as 
to their situation and chances of success at a trial, if that route is elected. A key 
theme that emerged from the interviews was the need for experts in general, and 
in particular, if setting up a tribunal.
Seventh, since it is recommended that a traditional legal action for defamation 
is maintained, this tribunal would operate as a complement to court actions.
Eighth, techno-legal solutions are critical to resolve online defamation 
complaints, because they operate within the communities where the defamation 
208. ODRAG, supra note 4 at 9.
209. Ibid at 17.
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took place. Courts are often divorced from context. An online tribunal, because of 
its structure, is in a better position to facilitate delivery of techno-legal solutions.
The structure of the CRT process translates to defamation disputes. If a similar 
four-phase process is used in the defamation context it might work as follows. 
In Phase One’s information and diagnostic space, experts might help compile 
tools to facilitate diagnosis and resolution of the dispute. Many defamation 
litigants would be self-represented and such tools would help the claimant frame 
productive communication, diagnose the legal issues and craft responses.
If the parties fail to settle their dispute at this stage and a claim is filed, then 
Phase Two would offer technology-facilitated negotiation. The reader will recall 
that eBay reported that 85 per cent of disputes were resolved using software.210 
If Phase Two fails, the parties move to Phase Three: Human facilitated negotiation. 
If a settlement is reached, it can be made into a tribunal order. The fourth and 
final phase is adjudication. Here, the decision has the force of a court order.
The business case for this tribunal requires further analysis. It is unclear how 
many claimants would use such a tribunal. We know some of the data on total 
complaints to, for example, social-networking providers, although we cannot 
isolate defamation complaints. We know the chasm between complaints to 
online providers and the numbers of cases that make it to full determination in 
a court. Defamation parallels e-commerce in that most do not sue and providing 
this tribunal would open-up an avenue of redress to those for whom it would 
otherwise be unavailable. The business case is strengthened if the scope of this 
tribunal is widened to include online abuse more generally, such as invasion of 
privacy, including non-consensual sharing of intimate images. However, such a 
proposal is beyond the scope of this article.211
Several issues require further commentary, namely whether the tribunal should 
be mandatory or voluntary, private or public, whether legal representation should 
be permitted and whether the tribunal should have the power to award damages.
Mandatory or voluntary. There are strengths and weaknesses to mandatory 
use of such a tribunal. My inclination is to conclude that use of the tribunal 
should be voluntary for the claimant. This is because the underlying reasoning 
in this article is that a tribunal is complementary to a traditional court action 
210. Thompson, “Growth of ODR,” supra note 132 at 1.1.3.
211. Broadening the scope of the tribunal would require further analysis. For example, the 
objective of complainants concerning other types of harm, in particular privacy invasions, 
is likely different. Defamation claimants usually seek public accountability, while privacy 
complainants often seek to contain revelation of private information, whatever the reason, 
and thus further publicity to the claimant would create further harm.
(2018) 56 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL200
for defamation. A mandatory tribunal circumvents choice for the claimant and 
might impose greater costs on the litigants, especially for cases that are obviously 
suitable for court. Regardless, the defendant should be bound to the tribunal 
process if the complainant chooses that route, recognizing the enduring difficulty 
with anonymous or out-of-country defendants. I recommend that intermediaries 
be required to provide a link to the ODR mechanism to Canadian users.
Private or public. One option is to outsource such a dispute resolution 
service to a private body. There are certainly models for this kind of structure. 
The Canadian Internet Registration Authority has a contract with two Canadian 
arbitration providers to resolve domain names disputes.212 With the goals identified 
in this article, a tribunal created by legislation and through government would 
be more appropriate. A private route would simply layer private resolution on 
top of whatever private resolution is currently offered by some online companies.
Legal representation. As this article identified, the CRT largely does not 
permit legal representation, although lawyers can work as helpers for litigants. 
In contrast, the United Kingdom Online Court plans to allow legal representation. 
In Bernstein’s virtual model of containment, erasure, and rehabilitation, lawyers 
risk being impediments to the advantages of ADR:
Containment, erasure, and rehabilitation fare better with lower costs, which in 
turn commends removing lawyers. Counsel can offer great value for plaintiffs and 
defendants in dignitary-tort actions but, as a general rule, only when the claims 
feature high damages, celebrity or notoriety, or pro bono implications. A dispute 
resolution mechanism that rests on the oft-stated contention that “it’s not about 
the money,” can conserve expenditures on damages, attorney time, and court 
formalities. Inside our virtual injury paradigm, lawyers impede remedies and 
increase transaction costs.213
Lawyers should be restricted to “helper roles” for the first three phases, as they 
depend on direct litigant participation. This reflects the focus on problem solving 
and outcomes that is the crux of the tribunal, and the speed in resolution that 
is necessary to achieve the appropriate outcomes. However, I recommend that 
legal representation be permitted for the adjudication phase. Given the expected 
expertise of the adjudicator, this alleviates potentially uneven power between 
self-represented and represented litigants.
Damages. I hesitate to limit the tribunal to non-damages remedies. Previously, 
I have recommended that a regulator should, at minimum, have the power to 
212. CIRA, supra note 120.
213. Bernstein, supra note 45 at 1485-86.
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impose fines.214 The benefit is evident with the United Kingdom’s Information 
Commissioner’s Office, which is a much stronger regulator since gaining the 
power to award fines.215 Similar calls are being made for the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner.216 That said, in a defamation context, damages largely do not 
align with the outcomes sought by most litigants. Rather, as this article examined, 
defamation plaintiffs seek restoration of their reputation. This opens the door for 
other remedies, especially techno-legal solutions, that better target the kinds of 
harms explored here, but deploying many of these solutions can be costly.
IV. CONCLUSION
Lord Justice Briggs captures my thoughts on these matters in his comments about 
his recommendation to create an online court:
While I have no doubt that its design and launch will be attended by setbacks, 
teething troubles and unexpected difficulties, I consider that the objective of making 
the civil courts more generally accessible to individuals and small businesses, for a 
just resolution of their simpler and small to modest value disputes at proportionate 
cost, fully justifies the risks in stepping a little into the unknown, and even the small 
risk that the time, money and effort about to be devoted to it may turn out to have 
been wasted.
Those risks are in any event capable of being minimised by a thorough process of 
testing before launch, by a soft launch in stages, (as is being done for the CRT), and 
by ongoing development of the first generation model after launch, as its inevitable 
teething troubles emerge.217
214. Laidlaw, Regulating Speech, supra note 183 at 263-65.
215. Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (UK). This power increased with the General 
Data Protection Regulation. See EC, Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European 
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to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), [2016] OJ, L 119/1. Since gaining this 
power, one news article states that the ICO issued fines of 17.8 million pounds and collected 
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In the area of defamation law, the objective is to make resolution of 
reputational disputes more accessible to complainants. As explored in this article, 
complainants currently have two options: Complain to the intermediary or launch 
a civil action. While complaints to intermediaries can solve the dispute some 
of the time, there are drawbacks. Notably, the dispute resolution procedures of 
intermediaries vary wildly, with some providing no method of resolving disputes. 
This makes it difficult to develop and sustain standards for resolving defamation 
disputes through company-developed procedures.
More generally, many of the processes bear little resemblance to traditional 
dispute resolution, with minimal transparency, accountability, accessibility, 
consistency, or due process. Civil actions offer a resolution for the few cases that 
are litigated, but given the length, cost, and uncertain outcomes, traditional 
actions are not a viable solution for most defamation complainants. This leaves 
a significant chasm where we have a high volume of defamation complaints and 
few methods of resolution.
This invites the re-imagining of a system of dispute resolution that improves 
access to justice and better delivers the outcomes sought by defamation 
complainants, namely non-pecuniary interests in a restoration of reputation, 
correction of falsity, or vengeance. In this article, I argue that the above are best 
met through the creation of an ODR tribunal envisioned as a complement to 
traditional litigation and company-incentivized complaints mechanisms. Such 
a tribunal would not solve all the problems wrought by online defamation. 
Indeed, anonymity and jurisdiction continue to present significant challenges 
to the resolution of defamation disputes. However, the proposal potentially 
provides an avenue for resolution for many defamation complainants, while the 
current system provides resolution to very few. An online tribunal is in a better 
position to provide specialized services, speedy resolution, techno-legal solutions, 
containment, erasure, and public communication, all of which are important 
tools for resolving online defamation disputes. In this way, an ODR tribunal 
arguably acts as a bridge, connecting the court system to online communities.
